Every team would love to have an athletic, 6’4” rocket-armed passer throwing to a 6’3” receiver with 4.4 speed while an SEC Defensive Player of the Year 6’6” 270 lb defensive end chases opposing quarterbacks. But you’re not going to get those guys except by picking at the top of the draft, or by dumb luck. If you do happen to acquire a franchise superstar, awesome, but to fill out your team you must have a plan for seeking out players that 31 other teams aren’t also chasing after.
Belichick explained New England’s unconventional approach in a talk at the Salesforce World Tour:
One of the things we’ve tried to do is be a little bit of an outlier in some respects. When I came to the Patriots in 2000 as the head coach, we played a 3-4 defense, and we only had two teams in the NFL, us and the Pittsburgh Steelers, who played a 3-4. We had quite a bit of success, won three Super Bowls in four years, and by 2005, half the league was playing a 3-4 defense. So when I came here trying to find a nose tackle like Ted Washington, it was easy because no one else wanted him. Five years later, if we were looking for a nose tackle, there were probably five other teams in the draft ahead of us.
We’ve kind of had to find different players, different schemes, whether it be tight end-based offenses or whether it be going from an odd to an even front defensively, whatever it happened to be, trying to find different ways to capitalize on the talent that’s available. Otherwise, we’re going to get like the fifth-, sixth-, seventh-best guy at whatever the position is. So we’ve tried to take more of our way in areas that are less populated.
New England’s draft picks cut across the grain of traditional ideas of positional value. The Patriots have used first-round picks on big defensive linemen (Richard Seymour, Ty Warren, Vince Wilfork, Malcom Brown), guards (Logan Mankins and Cole Strange), off-ball linebackers (Jerod Mayo and Dont’a Hightower), tight ends (Daniel Graham and Ben Watson), and safeties (Brandon Meriweather and Devin McCourty), while rarely targeting more glamorous positions like edge rusher (only Chandler Jones) and wide receiver (only N’Keal Harry).
These non-premier positions help with salary management. For instance, at his most expensive, All-Pro tight end Rob Gronkowski led the position with a cap hit of a little over $11.5 MM in 2018. Nine wide receivers had higher cap hits that year, topped by Mike Evans at nearly $18.3 MM. Building an offense that features a star tight end is less expensive than building one that features a top wideout. Teams that build around expensive, marquee positions, even if they are somehow able to assemble several top talents, are going to have a hard team keeping them together under the cap.
The Pittsburgh Steelers of the early 2000’s also experienced tremendous success, and also showed a willingness to buck conventional wisdom in terms of positional value. The most decorated player on their defenses was four-time All-Pro and eight-time Pro Bowler Troy Polamalu, a safety. The most acclaimed offensive player was six-time All-Pro and seven-time Pro Bowler Alan Faneca, a guard. Both were first-round selections. Pittsburgh often invested high picks at “non-premium” positions, while managing to find undervalued assets at higher-ticket-price spots, like star wideout Antonio Brown in the sixth round and edge rusher James Harrison as an undrafted free agent. Both lacked ideal size but gave stellar performances for the Steelers.
New England and Pittsburgh aren’t the only savvy teams to see merit in differentiation to find undervalued assets. “Everybody has to find their own model. You hope that your model not only is different but takes advantage of what are perceived market inefficiencies,” Los Angeles Rams COO Kevin Demoff told The Athletic. Eagles GM Howie Roseman agrees:
We’re spending a lot of time going, ‘All right, like how can we zig when there’s zagging?' Like, we don’t want to buy into the narrative that everyone else is, because [then] you’re buying into an overvalued market. So we’re trying to kind of look at those things to be different. I think it’s OK to be different.
The holy grail is aligning the team’s vision with an undervalued asset. Belichick gave the example above of 3-4 nose tackles in an era dominated by 4-3 defenses. The Seattle Seahawks built their “Legion of Boom” defense in part by acquiring long press corners that weren’t as quick or as fast as most team’s prototypes (see Sidebar). Hall-of-Famer Bill Walsh’s “West Coast Offense” and its emphasis on the short passing game let him thrive with quarterbacks who did not have tremendous arm strength. The zone blocking run scheme employed by the late ‘90’s Denver Broncos worked best with athletic, undersized offensive linemen—players they found at a discount while most of the league was thinking “bigger is better” (see Chapter 2).
Teams can also find bargains by obtaining players with sub-standard physical dimensions, off-field issues, injury risks, or unusual backgrounds. Quarterback Russell Wilson was a third-round pick despite terrific athleticism, fine arm talent, and impressive college statistics, because he stands only 5’11”. Understandably, few teams wanted to take a chance on Tyreek Hill after he was thrown out of Oklahoma State for hitting and choking his pregnant girlfriend, but he turned into a game-breaking receiver for the Kansas City Chiefs, who took him in the fifth round. Jason Peters, one of the best left tackles of his generation, was an undrafted college tight end that the Buffalo Bills groomed into a blindside protector.
Decision-makers must consider the team’s vision when pursuing outliers and alternative strategies. If you’re running a Seattle-style cover 3 with long press corners, you probably shouldn’t make an exception for cornerback height or arm length. If you want to build the fastest defense in the league, a linebacker running a 4.8 won’t work, regardless of his other qualities. The vision helps provide parameters within which to operate, and teams should take as many liberties as they can that don’t contradict their mission. If tackle height isn’t part of your criteria for the offensive line, why not try a 6’4” lineman there? Anything not constrained by the parameters of the vision is fair game. In an evolving NFL, what constitutes “being unique” will change over time, and flexibility and creativity is vital to staying on the cutting edge.
Bill Polian explained how the values and vision of the Indianapolis Colts helped determine what exceptions they would pursue, and which they would not:
As time went by, we said that even if we drafted down low—and we drafted below 20 for most of the 14 years we were there—there were certain qualities in prospects that we weren’t going to sacrifice. Under [head coach] Tony [Dungy], we were unwilling to sacrifice character and football temperament. Number two, there was no way we were going to sacrifice speed. And, three, there was no way we were going to sacrifice explosion.
We decided we could sacrifice height, and we did.
The Colts found exceptional short players like edge rusher Dwight Freeney and safety Bob Sanders and built their defense around them.
The best teams are doing things differently than other teams. Not every unconventional decision is going to work, but teams that play copycat or chase trends will consign themselves to mediocrity. Uniqueness plays a key role as the team-building element that distinguishes competent teams from special ones.
Teams also look for edges away from the field. The Eagles and New Orleans Saints have been at the forefront of creative cap maneuverings, often using “void years” to push cap charges into future seasons and let them keep or add key pieces. The Rams have been very aggressive in trading draft picks for veteran players (see Chapter 5). The Baltimore Ravens, on the other hand, have found value in being conservative, letting players walk in free agency, clearing cap space and netting compensatory picks to feed their draft and development machine.
In an increasingly competitive league, the advantages and bargains get smaller over time. Teams have to look everywhere for small edges: scheme, coaching hires, contract structure, scouting methodologies, athletic training staff, player development systems, compensatory picks, GPS data, draft pick trades, psychological testing—all these are areas different teams are exploring to find their “inches.” Rams GM Les Snead sums up the mentality, the question Los Angeles asks themselves: “[I]s there anything we can be doing that they’re not doing to give us an edge, in a league that’s hard to get an edge in?”